AI Prompts
Instruction sets for investment research. Copy one into the AI tool of your choice, name the company, and compare your result with the worked example.
- Company Analysis
- Reverse DCFComing soon
Company Analysis
A ten-section report on any public company: business, thesis, fundamentals, latest earnings, twelve-month cash flow, insiders, institutions, moat, risks and technicals. The instructions make the AI pull primary filings and say so when data is stale.
- What you provide
- A ticker or company name, such as “Analyze HWM”
- Works best with
- An AI tool that can search the web and open SEC filings
- Output
- Ten fixed sections, a Bull-to-Bear stance, sources and a disclaimer
Instructions
Automatic copying was blocked by your browser. The text is selected, so press Ctrl+C (Cmd+C on Mac).
Example output
Old Dominion Freight Line (NASDAQ: ODFL) β Company Analysis
Price: $186.85 (Oct 19 session, last quote verified) Β· Data as of: Oct 20, 2026 (pre-market)
Fiscal year: calendar year (Dec 31) Β· Latest reported results: Q2 2026 (released Jul 29, 2026; 10-Q filed Aug 5)
Next catalyst: Q3 2026 results, Oct 28, 2026, before the open
The official Oct 19 close and today's pre-market quote were not verified.
π’ 1. BUSINESS OVERVIEW
Old Dominion is one of the largest North American less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers. It consolidates small freight shipments (avg. 1,503 lbs) through a continental-US network of service centers. It is a single reportable segment, union-free, and sells on service: 99% on-time, 0.1% claims ratio. Headquartered in Thomasville, NC; founded 1934.
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Revenue mix | LTL services 99.0% of H1 2026 revenue ($2.861B of $2.889B); other services (container drayage, truckload brokerage, supply chain consulting) 1.0% |
| End markets / customers | Demand tracks US industrial production and the domestic economy. Customer concentration not disclosed. |
| Geography | Domestic. Avg. length of haul 909 miles. Canada and Mexico served through carrier alliances. |
| Workforce | 20,081 avg. full-time employees in Q2, down 7.1% YoY while revenue rose 10.4% |
| Strategy | No pivot. Build capacity ahead of demand, price for yield, protect service. ~35% capacity buffer; capex below the usual 10β15%-of-revenue range in 2025 and 2026. |
| Management | CEO Marty (Kevin M.) Freeman since Jul 1, 2023 (30-year veteran; predecessor Greg Gantt remains a director). CFO Adam Satterfield. Executive Chairman David Congdon. |
| Board change | Sep 22, 2026: director John Kasarda (since 2008) retired; Worthing Jackman (ex-CEO Waste Connections; Quanta director) joined. No disagreement cited. |
| Pricing action | 4.9% general rate increase effective Oct 5, 2026 |
π― 2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Stance: π’ CAUTIOUS BULL (conviction: moderate)
ODFL is the best-run LTL franchise in an early-stage earnings recovery: Q2 EPS +32%, operating ratio down 450 bps to 70.1%, net cash, and ~$1.1B of LTM free cash flow. But at $186.85 it trades at 35.9x trailing and 29.6x forward earnings (21x EV/EBITDA), and the recovery so far is price, fuel pass-through and cost cuts, not volume (tons β4.1%, shipments β5.7% in Q2). The stock is already 26% off its June peak, which de-risks the multiple somewhat; it does not make it cheap. Insiders are sellers, and analysts have been trimming targets into the print.
What drives the stance
- π’ Margin recovery is real. Direct costs improved 230 bps of revenue; productive labor fell to 21.7% of revenue from 24.4%. Q3 guide implies OR of ~70.1β70.6% vs 74.3% a year ago.
- π‘ Volume is the swing factor. Tons/day improved from β4.1% (Q2) to β1.0% (July) and β0.9% (Aug). An inflection would justify the multiple; no inflection compresses it.
- π΄ Quality and valuation caveats. $17.2M of one-time disposal gains flattered Q2, and ~two-thirds of rev/cwt growth was fuel surcharge.
Primary risk to the thesis: volumes stay negative while the market keeps paying a recovery multiple, so earnings grow but the stock does not.
Near-term test: Q3 on Oct 28 (consensus EPS $1.61 vs $1.29 a year ago). Tonnage flat/positive with OR β€70.6% supports the bull case; OR above ~71% or tonnage worse than β3% would move me to Neutral.
π 3. FUNDAMENTALS
| Metric | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue (LTM) | $5.60B | Q2 +10.4% YoY Β· FY25 β5.5% |
| Gross margin | n/a | Not reported by ODFL |
| Operating margin (LTM) | 25.8% | OR 74.2% Β· Q2 OR 70.1% |
| EBITDA margin (LTM) | 32.4% | EBITDA $1.82B |
| EPS (LTM, GAAP) | $5.20 | Q2 $1.68, +32%; no non-GAAP |
| Forward P/E (NTM) | 29.6x | LTM P/E 35.9x |
| EV / EBITDA (LTM) | 21.2x | EV $38.5B Β· mkt cap $38.7B |
| Net cash | $264M | Cash $284M Β· debt $20M |
Revenue trajectory: FY2025 revenue fell 5.5% to $5.50B (third year of a freight recession), Q1 2026 was β2.9%, then Q2 jumped +10.4%. Management guides Q3 to about +10% ($1.54β1.55B). The driver is yield: LTL revenue/cwt +15.2% in Q2, but only +5.5% excluding fuel surcharges (diesel cost/gallon +70.5% YoY).
Margins: LTM operating margin 25.8% vs 24.8% in FY25. Q2 hit 29.9%. Salaries and benefits fell to 44.2% of revenue from 47.7% on a 7.1% smaller workforce; offset by operating supplies (mostly diesel) rising to 11.4% from 10.1%. Employee benefit costs ran 42.0% of wages vs 39.5%, a headwind that scales with profit.
Balance sheet: $283.9M cash; $20.0M of 3.10% senior notes due May 2027; $400M revolver undrawn ($368.2M available). Net debt/EBITDA β β0.15x (net cash). Interest expense was $0.4M in H1 vs $4.7M of interest income, so coverage is not meaningful.
Capital allocation: capex first, then buybacks ($239.7M in H1; $1.31B authorization left), then a $1.16 annual dividend (0.62% yield). No M&A.
Valuation context: year-end P/E was 11.8x (FY22), 17.8x (FY23), 31.6x (FY24), 31.9x (FY25). Today's 35.9x LTM is above the last two year-ends and roughly double the 2022β23 range. Peer multiples (Saia, XPO, FedEx Freight) were not retrieved, so no peer-relative claim is made.
π 4. MOST RECENT EARNINGS β Q2 2026 (quarter ended Jun 30, 2026; reported Jul 29, 2026)
Result: π’ BEAT Β· π‘ Stock fell
| Metric | Actual | Consensus | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1,554.0M (+10.4%) | ~$1.54B | π’ Beat, ~+1% |
| Diluted EPS | $1.68 (+32.3%) | $1.53β1.54 (sources differ) | π’ Beat, +$0.14β0.15 |
| Operating income | $465.3M (+30.0%) | $416.6M (EBIT) | π’ Beat |
| Operating ratio | 70.1% (β450 bps) | n/a | π’ |
Operating ratio and EPS by quarter
| Quarter | OR | EPS |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 2025 | 75.4% | $1.19 |
| Q2 2025 | 74.6% | $1.27 |
| Q3 2025 | 74.3% | $1.29 |
| Q4 2025 | 76.7% | $1.09 |
| Q1 2026 | 76.2% | $1.14 |
| Q2 2026 | 70.1% | $1.68 |
| Q3 2026 (guide / consensus) | ~70.4% | $1.61 est. |
Q3 2025 OR and EPS derived as FY2025 minus Q1, Q2 and Q4. The Q3 2026 row is management's guide (flat to +50 bps vs Q2) and consensus EPS, not a result.
Guidance (not formally raised or lowered): Q3 revenue growth ~10% ($1.54β1.55B), OR flat to +50 bps vs Q2, July revenue/day +8.2%. 2026 capex raised to ~$380M from $265M (+$115M). August update: revenue/day +12.4%, tons/day β0.9%. Management expects rev/cwt growth to slow in Q3 on freight mix.
Commentary themes: yield discipline, "superior service at a fair price," capacity in place to win share as demand recovers.
One-time items: $17.2M net gains on property disposals (vs a $1.6M loss in Q2 2025). That is ~111 bps of the 450 bps OR improvement and ~$0.06 of EPS, so a cleaner Q2 is roughly 71.2% OR and ~$1.62 EPS.
Market reaction: a beat-and-sell. Shares fell ~4.6β4.8% in the days after the release (as of Jul 31); the exact earnings-day close was not verified. The stock is down 19.8% from its Jul 24 close of $232.99.
Guidance record: beats of 8.5% (Q1) and ~9% (Q2) after a small miss in Q2 2025 suggest management guides conservatively on near-term margin, so skepticism should focus on volume, not OR.
π΅ 5. CASH FLOW (LTM to Jun 30, 2026)
LTM = FY2025 + H1 2026 β H1 2025, from the 10-K and 10-Q. Net cash change ties exactly to the reported cash balance move ($24.1M to $283.9M).
| Operating cash flow | Free cash flow | Returned to holders | Net cash after all activity |
|---|---|---|---|
| $1,394M (24.9% of rev) | $1,115M (19.9% margin; FCF/NI 1.02x) | $783M (70% of FCF) | +$260M ($24M β $284M) |
Bridge: OCF β FCF β Net change in cash ($M)
| Step | $M |
|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | 1,394.1 |
| Capex | β279.3 |
| Free cash flow | 1,114.8 |
| Property sales + other investing | +84.0 |
| Share buybacks | β545.4 |
| Dividends | β237.7 |
| Debt repaid ($20M note + $130M revolver) | β150.0 |
| Other financing | β5.8 |
| Net change in cash | +259.9 |
| Area | LTM detail |
|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | $1,394.1M. H1 2026 OCF $646.3M, +3.8% YoY on higher net income, partly offset by working capital. FY2025 was $1,370.1M, down 17.4% from $1,659.3M on lower earnings. |
| Working capital | H1 2026 absorbed $123.8M (vs $99.1M in H1 2025); LTM roughly flat. Customer receivables $594.5M, +12.1% YoY vs revenue +10.4%, so DSO ~34.8 days vs ~34.3 (fuel-inflated billings). Payables $81.0M (+$18.3M vs Dec); comp/benefit accruals +$41M. No inventory line (carrier). No unusual swings. |
| Capex | $279.3M gross, 5.0% of revenue, 0.76x D&A ($368.9M). With maintenance = D&A, implied growth capex β β$90M: the network is not expanding. Net of $80.9M property sale proceeds, $198.4M. Net capex: $751M (2024), $367M (2025), lower now. But the 2026 guide of ~$380M implies ~$240M in H2 vs $140M in H1 ($180M real estate, $155M equipment, $45M tech) β roughly D&A, so still near-zero growth capex. |
| M&A | None. Net M&A cash impact $0. |
| Other investing | Property and equipment sales $80.9M (H1 2026: $39.4M incl. $20.1M of gains). Other investing ~+$3M. No securities purchases. |
| Financing β debt | No new debt. Repaid $20M term note (May 2026) and $130M revolver (drawn H1 2025, repaid H2 2025). Debt now $20.0M; net cash $263.9M; leverage n.m. |
| Financing β equity | Buybacks $545.4M (H1 2026 $239.7M, β44% YoY; 1.17M shares retired at ~$200 avg.; $1.31B authorization left). Dividends $237.7M. Net SBC issuance ~114K shares in H1 (tax withholding $5.1M). Diluted share count β1.6% YoY. |
Quality check: π’ OCF is 1.28x net income (D&A-heavy business, normal), the company is fully self-funded, and there is no external capital. Watch: receivables growing slightly faster than revenue, a buyback pace that has slowed as the stock ran, and capex re-accelerating. No red flags.
π΄οΈ 6. INSIDER ACTIVITY
Posture: π‘ Net seller, no buys. About $16M of identified open-market selling and zero open-market buying over roughly the last nine months, by directors and non-CEO/CFO executives. That is ~0.04% of market cap: a soft negative, not an alarm. The filing text accessed does not state Rule 10b5-1 status, so no sale is labeled plan-based.
| Date | Insider | Transaction |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 25 | Cecil Overbey Jr., SVP Strategic Development | Sold 19,952 sh @ $198.39 β $3.96M (22,746 left) |
| May 4 | Greg Gantt, director (ex-CEO) | Sold 22,107 sh @ $191.52 β $4.23M |
| Feb 26 | Earl Congdon, Chair Emeritus / Sr. Advisor | Sold 25,000 sh @ ~$196.13 β $4.9M |
| Feb 18 | Bradley Gabosch, director | Sold 3,134 sh @ ~$194 β $0.61M |
| Feb 9 | Greg Gantt, director | β $2.4M (aggregator figure) |
| May 18β27 | David Congdon (Exec. Chair), Earl Congdon | Gifts: 295,670 + 73,730 + 7,370 sh (non-market) |
CEO / CFO signal: Freeman has no open-market trades; Feb 2026 activity was grants and tax withholding. Satterfield also shows only tax withholding in Feb 2026; his last open-market buy was 2,460 shares at $175.93 on Mar 4, 2025. Neutral.
Last verified: Form 4 listings through Aug 26, 2026. SeptemberβOctober filings could not be confirmed. Insiders own ~8.2% (Congdon family concentration is a disclosed risk). A Feb 25 David Congdon entry (~$10.1M) appears in one aggregator; direction not verified, so excluded.
π¦ 7. INSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENT
Signal: π‘ Mixed
| Institutional ownership | Analyst ratings (Buy / Hold / Sell) | Avg. price target | Short interest |
|---|---|---|---|
| 82.4% (~952 13F holders) | 10 / 15 / 1 β consensus Hold | $223.48, +19.6% vs $186.85 (range $156β$250) | 4.6β4.9% of float (stale; see below) |
13F flows (Q1 2026 vs Q4 2025 aggregator snapshot; Q2 filings not verified): buyers were FMR (+4.8M to 11.7M sh), Parnassus (+1.5M), Balyasny (+1.3M), Franklin (+1.2M) and BlackRock (+0.3M to 14.9M). Sellers were T. Rowe Price (β1.9M to 12.3M) and Northern Trust (β1.7M). Holder count rose by 32 but total institutional shares fell 6.4%: broad support, slightly less conviction.
Street actions: the trend into the print is target cuts β Stifel $263 β $230 (Buy) and Truist $250 β $230 (Oct 7β8), BMO $260 β $235, Raymond James $241 β $215 (Outperform, Oct 15). Morgan Stanley Hold (Oct 8). On the other side: Citigroup upgraded to Buy on Sep 8 ($223) and Bernstein initiated at Market Perform ($200) on Sep 10. Consensus targets still sit ~18β20% above the price.
Short interest: not crowded, no squeeze setup. 11β15M shares (7% of float) in Q1, down to 7.7M (3.7%) by Aug 21, and Benzinga showed 4.6β4.9% and rising in mid-September. I do not have access to a current (Sep 30 or Oct 15 settlement) short interest figure as of Oct 20. Last verified: mid-September.
π° 8. COMPETITIVE MOAT
Rating: π’ WIDE (my assessment) Β· π‘ being tested on share
The moat is network density and efficient scale: LTL economics depend on terminal coverage, and new terminals take years because of zoning and real estate. ODFL owns the largest unused slice of that scarce asset (~35% capacity buffer), prices off a service premium (99% on-time, 0.1% claims), and runs a union-free cost base. The result is an OR near 70% when many competitors are in the 80sβ90s (peer OR not re-verified here).
| Competitor | Differentiation vs ODFL |
|---|---|
| FedEx Freight | Largest LTL carrier; spun off as an independent company in June 2026, expected to chase share more aggressively in H2 |
| XPO | Pure-play LTL, technology-forward, adding capacity; #3 by share |
| Saia | Fast-growing, 218 terminals; took a 7.1% GRI in July vs ODFL's 4.9% |
| ArcBest / ABF | Union network; Estes and R+L (private) also scale players |
Durability: the cost and density advantages are intact and arguably widening (OR gap, capacity buffer). The thing to watch is share: ODFL's shipments are down 6.8% in H1 and ~7.5% over two years while some peers report growth, a sign it is trading volume for yield. Barriers: real estate scarcity and permitting, DOT/FMCSA authority, and a decade of service-quality reputation; little IP. New entrants (Amazon expanding LTL, a re-energized FedEx Freight) are the narrowing risk.
β οΈ 9. KEY RISKS
| Risk | Why it matters | Horizon |
|---|---|---|
| Valuation / multiple compression | 35.9x LTM P/E and 21x EV/EBITDA price in a full recovery. The stock is already β26% from its June high on de-rating alone. | π΄ Near-term |
| No volume inflection | Q2 shipments β5.7%, July β3.0%. Yield-only growth is finite; the multiple needs tonnage to turn. | π΄ Near-term |
| Fuel-flattered revenue | Rev/cwt +15.2% vs +5.5% ex-fuel; diesel cost/gal +70.5%. A fuel reversal lowers reported revenue growth and headline yield. | π‘ Near-term |
| Earnings quality | $17.2M disposal gains (~111 bps of OR) in Q2; benefit costs rising to 42% of wages; the Q3 OR guide includes normalization. | π‘ Near-term |
| Competitive disruption | Independent FedEx Freight, Saia terminal growth, Amazon LTL. ODFL's lower 4.9% GRI is a deliberate share-defense choice. | π΅ Structural |
| Macro / cycle and tariffs | August Freight TSI β3.0% YoY; demand ties to industrial production. A weak holiday season or tariff shock would push out recovery. | π‘ Cyclical |
| Capex re-acceleration and governance | 2026 capex guide up 43% mid-year to ~$380M; Congdon family control (~8% insider ownership); recent director turnover. | π΅ Structural |
π 10. TECHNICALS
Setup: π‘ Basing below the 200-DMA
| Price (Oct 19 session) | 52-week range | Position in range | RSI (14) |
|---|---|---|---|
| $186.85 (YTD +19.7% vs $156.14) | $126.01 β $252.03 (low Nov 20, 2025; high Jun 9, 2026) | 48% (+48.3% from low, β25.9% from high) | n/a |
Moving averages (MarketBeat, as of Oct 17): price is π΄ 0.9% below the 50-day ($188.60) and π΄ 10.0% below the 200-day ($207.59). The 50-day was well above the 200-day in July, but the stock has since given back its gains.
Levels (from verified prices): resistance at $188.60 (50-DMA) and $189.59 (Oct 19 high), then the 200-DMA near $207; support near $183 (Oct 13 close) and $173 (Sep 18 close, the recent low verified).
Setup: a base-building bounce. The stock is +8.0% from the Sep 18 close of $173.00 and +5% over the last two weeks, but remains in a downtrend below a falling 200-day, down ~19% over three months. A close above ~$190 would clear the 50-day and the recent high; a loss of $173 would reopen the post-earnings lows. The Oct 28 print is the catalyst; implied-move data was not retrieved.
I do not have access to a current RSI(14) reading as of Oct 20. Last verified readings were 40 (Aug 21) and 45 (Jul 2), too stale to use. Moving averages are 3 days old; support/resistance are my own read of verified closes, not a vendor technical study.
Sources
- ODFL Q2 2026 earnings release (SEC EX-99.1)
- ODFL Q4 2025 earnings release (SEC EX-99.1)
- ODFL Q2 2026 Form 10-Q
This analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Always conduct your own due diligence before making investment decisions.
Automatic copying was blocked by your browser. The text is selected, so press Ctrl+C (Cmd+C on Mac).